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Abstract
Consumers are rarely sure of the exact standard that a quality certi￿cate or label
represents. We show how the resulting need to jointly estimate product quality and
standard di¢ culty undermines the ability of voluntary certi￿cation to reduce information
asymmetries. First, since consumers are most suspicious of a label when a product with
a bad reputation has it, a ￿Groucho e⁄ect￿makes certi￿cation less rewarding to ￿rms
precisely when the information asymmetry is greatest. Second, as the number of available
labels increases, the e⁄ects of even small amounts of uncertainty are multiplied, and
the informativeness of certi￿cation decreases rather than increases. Third, uncertainty
makes certi￿cation and non-certi￿cation equilibria more likely to coexist as the number
of labels increases, so consumers face greater strategic uncertainty over how to interpret
the presence or absence of a label. Fourth, since a label can be either ￿legitimitized￿
or ￿spoiled￿for use by other products when a product with a good or bad reputation
displays it, ￿rms have an incentive to choose labels strategically. These e⁄ects can be
eliminated if certi￿cation is mandatory or if some standards are ￿focal,￿even if standards
remain uncertain. The model is applied to eco-labels and is also revelant for other product
labels, academic journals, club memberships, diplomas, and other common certi￿cation
environments.
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1 Introduction
Labels and other certi￿cates of quality prove that the bearer meets some standard, but the
di¢ culty of the standard is often uncertain. Consumers must then estimate whether a label
on a product is more indicative of a high quality product, or of an undemanding standard
for the label. For instance, when a car buyer sees that a vehicle has a Low Emissions label,
she will update both her estimate of the car￿ s environmental quality and of the meaning of
the Low Emissions label. If the car in question is a large SUV then the updating on both
dimensions is likely to be very di⁄erent than if the car is a small hybrid. This problem of
joint estimation of quality and standards arises in many contexts, such as the ability of a job
applicant and the value of his degree, the quality of a hotel and the toughness of the rating
system, the soundness of a company￿ s ￿nances and the standards of its auditor, or the quality
of an article and the editorial standards of the journal it appears in. We investigate how such
joint estimation a⁄ects the power of voluntary certi￿cation to reduce information asymmetries
about product quality, and focus in particular on ￿eco-labels￿for certifying environmental
quality.
Consumer uncertainty over the meaning of eco-labels is a widely recognized problem in
the policy literature on environmental quality certi￿cation. Policy research indicates that
consumers are unsure of the meaning of di⁄erent labels,1 especially since there are numerous
di⁄erent labels and each label can signify attainment of di⁄erent standards for a wide variety
of heterogeneous products.2 This uncertainty appears to be a signi￿cant reason behind the
di¢ culty of getting labels to be accepted by ￿rms, e.g., the slow adoption of the E.U. Flower
eco-label,3 and the incomplete adoption of eco-labels for forest products.4 The negative impact
of uncertainty on label adoption has motivated attempts to clarify voluntary standards, e.g.,
di⁄erent standards for ￿organic￿in the U.S.,5 or even to replace voluntary standards with
1A 2005 survey of US consumers by the Consumers Union revealed that most respondents incorrectly
believed that the label ￿organic￿on food implied that it was free of arti￿cial ingredients and chemical conta-
minants. CITEXXX
2Something about proliferation of standards. Dutch paper?
3For some product categories no products at all have been certi￿ed (xx). Surveys indicate that under-
standing of the label is far lower than of other regional and national eco-labels (Sto and Strandbakken, 2002).
4Internationally there are 21 di⁄erent certi￿cation standards with low adoption rates. Consumers appear
to have little information about the standards (Fischer et al., 2005).
5For instance, in response to confusion over multiple standards for ￿organic,￿ the US enacted legislation
in 2002 setting a uni￿ed standard that must be met to use the term in product claims.
1mandatory standards, e.g., the historic adoption of mandatory labels for some food products
in the U.S.
We show that concern over the e⁄ects of standard uncertainty on voluntary certi￿cation is
well founded. In addition to the direct information loss due to the uncertainty, the optimal re-
sponses of consumers and ￿rms lead to furthers losses that can greatly undermine or eliminate
the value of voluntary certi￿cation. First, certi￿cation is most valuable when consumers think
that a product is likely to be bad but in fact it is certi￿ably quite good. But when standards
are uncertain, if a product is expected to be low quality then there is a ￿Groucho e⁄ect￿in
which consumers infer that the certi￿cation standard is probably weak if such a product can
meet it. Just as Groucho Marx saw little value in joining a club that would accept him, a
￿rm with a bad reputation that should bene￿t the most from certi￿cation instead gains the
least. Therefore the incentive for certi￿cation is undermined when the problem of information
asymmetry, and therefore the potential gain from certi￿cation, is greatest.
Second, the presence of multiple labels with di⁄erent standards should create more oppor-
tunity for ￿rms of di⁄erent quality levels to certify themselves and thereby reduce information
asymmetries. But when standards are uncertain, the proliferation of labels has the opposite
impact. Since consumers do not know which standards are easy and which are di¢ cult, cer-
ti￿cation only proves that a ￿rm has met the easiest of the di⁄erent standards, even if the
￿rm has met a higher standard.6 We ￿nd that the gains to a ￿rm from voluntary certi￿-
cation shrink rather than rise as the number of standards increases, and a non-certi￿cation
equilibrium always exists for a su¢ ciently high number of standards. Moreover, even when a
certi￿cation equilibrium does exist, its informativeness goes to zero as the number of standards
increases.
Third, uncertain standards aggravate the problem of strategic uncertainty due to the coex-
istence of certi￿cation and non-certi￿cation equilibria. Multiple equilibria arise with voluntary
certi￿cation because if consumers expect a ￿rm to be certi￿ed then lack of certi￿cation is par-
ticularly damaging to the ￿rm￿ s expected quality, but if certi￿cation is not expected then the
￿rm loses less from not being certi￿ed and can save on certi￿cation costs. With certain stan-
dards, this multiplicity of equilibria disappears under a regularity condition as the number
of standards increases. But with uncertain standards we ￿nd instead that the multiple equi-
librium problem is aggravated by more standards and that certi￿cation and non-certi￿cation
equilibria always coexist for a su¢ ciently large number of standards unless certi￿cation costs
are so high that only non-certi￿cation is an equilibrium.
Finally, we ￿nd that uncertainty over standards generates information externalities be-
tween ￿rms that can lead to strategic behavior that reduces the informativeness of labels.
6As a policy report for the World Bank noted, ￿The diversity of ecolabels (which re￿ect the multitude of
certi￿cation schemes) can be confusing to consumers and weaken the credibility of all labels,￿(Fischer et al.,
2005). For instance, the Ecolabelling.org website lists 110 di⁄erent labels for organic foods in use.
2Certi￿cation of a ￿rm can ￿legitimize￿or ￿spoil￿the label for use by other ￿rms depending
on whether a ￿good￿￿rm with a favorable reputation or a ￿bad￿￿rm with an unfavorable
reputation is certi￿ed. Consequently if a good ￿rm adopts a particular label then bad ￿rms
have an incentive to adopt the same label, while good ￿rms instead have an incentive to avoid
labels adopted by bad ￿rms. Such strategizing makes it di¢ cult for consumers to rely on the
existing reputations of ￿rms as a simple way to learn about di⁄erent standards. The problem
is mitigated if the good ￿rm chooses its label ￿rst, which might explain the widespread indus-
try practice of launching new labels by promoting early adoption among ￿rms of recognized
high quality.
These results show that uncertainty over standards can greatly undermine the ability of
voluntary certi￿cation to solve information asymmetries. Mandatory certi￿cation also su⁄ers
from the direct information losses due to such uncertainty, but it does not face the additional
indirect information losses identi￿ed above. For instance, currently ￿rms can apply for ￿En-
ergy Star￿labels indicating energy e¢ ciency, but an alternative approach is to require ￿rms
to display a label indicating whether or not the product meets the standard.7 Such a require-
ment eliminates the multiplicity of equilibria and the strategic incentive to choose standards,
and also facilitates learning about the standard by consumers.8 Therefore these results pro-
vide one argument in favor of mandatory versus voluntary certi￿cation, even when mandatory
standards face the same problem that consumers are not sure of their exact meaning.
Short of mandatory certi￿cation, these results imply that there can be a role for govern-
ments or NGOs in making a particular standard ￿focal￿in the sense of publicizing it and
making consumers expects that ￿rms will adopt the standard if they meet it. This can reduce
or eliminate the information losses caused by standard proliferation and by strategic uncer-
tainty over which equilibria are being played by which ￿rms. For instance ￿look for the label￿
campaigns can be interpreted as encouraging consumers to focus on particular labels among
the multiplicity of possible labels. Attempts to ￿harmonize￿di⁄erent voluntary standards,
e.g., recent e⁄orts in the EU to harmonize eco-labels,9 can also be seen in this light.
A key source of consumer uncertainty over certi￿cation standards is that consumers are
often unsure of the source of a label or certi￿cate. Industry groups and for-pro￿t certi￿ers can
have an incentive to appear as pro-consumer or pro-environment NGOs, while NGOs often
have an incentive to appear as o¢ cial government agencies. This problem of confusion over
7Under mandatory certi￿cation ￿rms not meeting the standard can still o⁄er the product. Leland (1979)
analyzes the case of minimum quality standards in which ￿rms can be excluded from the market for not meeting
the standard. The application to environmental quality standards is considered by Arora and Gangopadhyay
(1995) and Lutz, Lyon, and Maxwell (2000), and the application to eco-labeling is analyzed by Amacher,
Koskela, and Ollikainen (2004) and Mattoo and Singh (1994).
8Certi￿cation increases information to consumers and reduces ex ante expected ￿rm pro￿ts by the certi￿-
cation cost, so mandatory certi￿cation is desirable if this cost is not too high.
9See ￿Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Community Ecolabel
Scheme,￿SEC(2008) 2118 and SEC(2008) 2119.
3label sources is widely recognized in the policy literature... In some cases the organization￿ s
name recognition is su¢ cient to reduce uncertainty over the source, e.g., the ￿Heart-Check￿
label for food products prominently notes that it is awarded by the American Heart Associ-
ation. But in other cases consumers are likely to remain unsure of the true source, e.g., the
similar-appearing ￿FSC￿and ￿PEFC￿labels are two of the main eco-labels for forest prod-
ucts, but one is controlled by an environmental NGO and the other by an industry-backed
NGO.
Even when the certi￿cation source is clear, the incentives of the source to set a particular
standard are not always so clear. If the source is a pro￿t-maximizing certi￿cation intermediary,
it has an incentive to set the standard at a low level to maximize the number of ￿rms which
pay for the certi￿cate (Lizzeri, 1999), but otherwise there is a wide range of possibilities. If the
source is an industry group, it has an incentive to set the standard so that all members of the
standard-setting coalition and no members of lower quality are certi￿ed (xx), but consumers
are unlikely to know the details of how a particular coalition size was determined. If the source
is an NGO, it might try to maximize information ￿ ows to consumers (xx) or punish low quality
￿rms (xx), or instead it might be captured by industry groups favoring easy standards (xx)
or by employees wanting to extract revenues or other non-pecuniary bene￿ts from ￿rms (xx).
And if the source is a government agency, it might act to maximize consumer welfare (xx)
or total welfare (xx), it might be induced by domestic industry to set standards so as to
undermine foreign competitors (xx), or it might even act to maximize its own revenues under
￿user-fee￿arrangements.
To capture these uncertainties, we model consumers as having a prior distribution of
the certi￿cation standard(s) that can be arbitrarily precise or di⁄use, and arbitrarily skewed
toward higher or lower levels. For instance, consumers might believe that an eco-label standard
is likely to be easy or di¢ cult, but be unsure of exactly how easy or di¢ cult, or they might
be completely uncertain of the di¢ culty. This distinguishes our approach from most of the
above analyses in which the standards are either assumed to be common knowledge, or can
be inferred from the incentives of certi￿cation intermediaries. Our model is most appropriate
for consumer product markets where buyers are unlikely to be well-informed, rather than for
markets for raw materials or intermediary products where buyers have strong incentives to
acquire exact information on the source and meaning of di⁄erent standards.
The question of mandatory versus voluntary certi￿cation or ￿disclosure￿ plays a large
role in the related literature on veri￿able message ￿persuasion￿games (e.g., Milgrom, 1981;
Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura, 1990). The classic ￿unravelling￿ result ￿nds
that voluntary disclosure through costless, veri￿able messages can fully reveal information
since even those with bad information have an incentive to prove they do not have worse
information. This result indicates that mandatory disclosure is often unnecessary, e.g., con-
sumer product labels should be adopted by ￿rms voluntarily, even when the information is
4relatively unfavorable. As recognized early on, a number of factors can interfere with the
incentive for voluntary disclosure.10 In particular, the idea that disclosure is often costly,
which plays a large role in our analysis, appears early on in this literature as a factor that
can disrupt the unravelling result (e.g., Viscusi, 1978; Jovanovic, 1982; Verrecchia, 1983).
Our analysis contributes to these literatures by showing that the combination of costly cer-
ti￿cation/disclosure and uncertainty is particularly disruptive to voluntary certi￿cation, and
that the e⁄ects are exacerbated when there are multiple standards. The idea that the im-
perfect nature of certi￿cation can have an important e⁄ect on certi￿cation strategies appears
in several papers that di⁄er from ours in other key respects. Fishman and Hagerty (1990)
consider costless disclosure of one of multiple noisy signals of ￿high￿or ￿low￿quality and con-
centrate on whether the sender should be restricted in which signals can be sent. Their results
are closely related to our ￿ndings on ￿focal￿equilibria as discussed later. Sinclair-Desgagne
and Gozlan (2003) also consider binary tests of quality that are known by consumers to vary
in accuracy and allow ￿rms to choose whether to take the more accurate or less accurate test.
Lerner and Tirole (2006) and Farhi, Lerner, and Tirole (2008) consider standards that are
known to be of di⁄ering di¢ culty and assume the ￿rm is uncertain of its own quality, so that
from the ￿rm￿ s perspective there is uncertainty over whether a particular standard will turn
out to be too di¢ cult. The key di⁄erence from these papers is that we assume that consumers
do not know which standards are more di¢ cult.
We discuss our results in the context of eco-labeling, but they apply to any certi￿cation
or labeling scheme about which uncertainty over standards exists. In a broader context, the
insights we develop apply to any situation in which observers must jointly update their beliefs
about an agent￿ s quality and an uncertain quality standard. For example, in the original
context of Groucho Marx￿ s comment, a disreputable individual might ￿nd it of little bene￿t
to join a club because the very fact of his membership downgrades the perceived standards
of the club. Similarly, reputable individuals or ￿rms have an incentive to join organizations
strategically so as to avoid the value of their memberships being degraded by disreputable
members. These e⁄ects are distinct from other related information e⁄ects. For instance,
a potential club member might take the willingness of the club to o⁄er membership as an
indication that there is little interest by other potential members, which could be analyzed
as either adverse selection in the supply of club openings or the winner￿ s curse in the demand
for club openings.11 Our analysis di⁄ers because we assume a ￿xed standard for joining the
10The sender might with some probability be uninformed (e.g., Dye, 1985; Shin, 2003), have a strategic
incentive to hide information (e.g., Dye, 1986; Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura, 1990; Board,
2005; Levin, Peck and Ye, 2005), or a reputational incentive to be understated (Grubb, 2008). Or the receiver
might be na￿ve (Dye, 1988), uninformed (Fishman and Hagerty, 2003), boundedly attentive (Hirshleifer, Lim,
and Teoh, 2002), or have her own private information (Harbaugh and To, 2006).
11Similarly, the no-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) is often referred to as the ￿Groucho Marx
Theorem.￿
5￿club￿that is uncertain to outsiders who judge both the standard of the club and the quality
of its members by the endogenous composition of the club.12
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we develop the basic model with one standard,
de￿ne the conditions for the existence of both certi￿cation and non-certi￿cation equilibria,
show the existence of the Groucho e⁄ect and analyze its impact on informativeness. In Sec-
tion 3 we analyze the multi-standard case, showing that the qualitative results of Section 2
continue to hold, and that the impact of the Groucho e⁄ect is worsened. In Section 4 we con-
sider strategic interactions between ￿rms when there are multiple standards and information
spillovers. In Section 5 we present our conclusions.
2 The Basic Model
We consider a ￿rm￿ s decision of whether to have its product certi￿ed that it meets a quality
standard. To capture the idea that consumers have some information about the product, let
the product￿ s ￿xed quality Q be distributed according to the distribution F with full support
on [0;1] and with corresponding density function f. For simplicity we assume that the ￿rm
has only one product so we will typically refer to Q as the ￿rm￿ s quality. In this section we
assume that there is only one possible standard. In Sections 3 and 4 we extend the model to
allow for multiple standards and multiple ￿rms.
To capture consumer knowledge about the quality standard, let the standard S be distrib-
uted according to G on [0;1]. We will compare the ￿uncertain￿case where G has full support
on [0;1] and has corresponding density g, with the ￿certain￿case where the realized value
of S = s is known. For simplicity we assume Q and S are independent. The ￿rm always
knows the realized values of Q and S. If Q ￿ S the ￿rm has a choice of either certi￿cation
or non-certi￿cation, i.e., a ￿rm that meets the standard need not choose to be certi￿ed. If
Q < S the ￿rm does not meet the standard so it has no choice.
The payo⁄to the ￿rm is its expected quality as estimated by consumers less a certi￿cation
cost if it chooses to certify. The expected quality assumption is standard in most certi￿cation
games and sender-receiver games more generally.13 It captures situations where, for instance,
there are multiple buyers bidding competitively for the product. The certi￿cation cost c ￿ 0
captures any fees to the certi￿er and any other costs, e.g., the expense of documenting quality
control processes, auditing costs by the certi￿er, and the opportunity cost of providing space
on the product packaging for the certi￿cation label.14
12Becker (1990) directly assumes that demand for a club is higher if others want to join the club, and
suggests a connection to Groucho Marx￿ s quote. Sobel (2001) considers the dynamics of club standards as
members are admitted, with an emphasis on when standards will decline.
13As long as ￿rms of higher perceived quality are more pro￿table, the qualitative results of the paper are
una⁄ected.
14When a ￿rm is certi￿ed we assume it displays a label informing customers of this fact. For an analysis of
6If consumers believe that a product has met the standard, the expected quality of the
product is its expected quality conditional on quality Q exceeding the standard S, where the
value of S is distributed according to G,










Similarly if consumers believe that a product has not met the standard, the expected quality
of the product is










These expectations include the special case where consumers know the realized value of S so
that G is degenerate, i.e., the standard is certain. In this case, which is closer to most models
in the literature, for a known value S = s the expectations simplify to






if the ￿rm is believed to have met the labeling standard and to






if it is believed to have not met the standard.
Our equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium subject to a belief-re￿nement
introduced below. In a certi￿cation equilibrium a ￿rm whose product meets or exceeds the
certi￿cation standard always certi￿es this fact, so the lack of a label implies failure to meet the
standard.15 Consumer beliefs used to update ￿rm quality are consistent this ￿rm strategy in
equilibrium, so the equilibrium condition is simply that the bene￿t from certi￿cation is higher
than the cost,16
E[QjQ ￿ S] ￿ E[QjQ < S] ￿ c: (5)
In a non-certi￿cation equilibrium a ￿rm does not certify its quality even if it can, so lack of
certi￿cation does not represent bad news that E[QjQ < S] but represents no news at all,
when withholding a label might be desirable see Harbaugh and To (2006).
15When a ￿rm is certi￿ed we assume it displays a label informing customers of this fact. For an analysis of
when withholding a label might be desirable see Harbaugh and To (2006). Note that since ￿rms know their
own quality they only apply for certi￿cation when they are certain to receive it. In a model where ￿rms do
not know their own quality, Farhi, Lerner, and Tirole (2008) consider the question of whether certi￿cation
intermediaries disclose which ￿rms fail to meet the certi￿cation standard.
16If a certi￿cation equilibrium exists there is also a partial certi￿cation equilibrium where only types in
some subset X ￿ [S;1] disclose with the knife-edge result that E[QjQ 2 X] ￿ E[QjQ = 2 X] = c. We do not
analyze this equilibrium in which all types are indi⁄erent between certi￿cation and non-certi￿cation.
7implying the prior E[Q] is unchanged. Certi￿cation in the non-certi￿cation equilibrium is
an unexpected, out of equilibrium action. We re￿ne the perfect Bayesian equilibrium set
by assuming that consumers believe that such an action is equally likely to have been by
any type that meets the standard, so unexpected certi￿cation is good news that generates
the posterior distribution E[QjQ ￿ S].17 Therefore the equilibrium condition for the non-
certi￿cation equilibrium is
E[QjQ ￿ S] ￿ E[Q] ￿ c: (6)
Comparing these two conditions, we see that since E[QjQ < S] < E[Q] the left hand side of
(5) is greater than the left hand side of (6) so one or the other of these two conditions must be
satis￿ed for any given c. Thus, at least one of these two pure strategy equilibria always exists.
Both conditions are satis￿ed simultaneously, indicating the existence of multiple equilibria,
when
E[QjQ ￿ S] ￿ E[Q] ￿ c ￿ E[QjQ ￿ S] ￿ E[QjQ < S] (7)
which is possible again by the fact that E[QjQ < S] < E[Q]. Regarding when one of the
equilibria is unique, the certi￿cation condition (5) cannot be satis￿ed for c su¢ ciently large
and the non-certi￿cation condition (6) cannot be satis￿ed for c su¢ ciently small. We state
these results as the following proposition.
Proposition 1 With either certain or uncertain standards, there exists c;c 2 (0;1) with c < c
such that a non-certi￿cation equilibrium exists i⁄ c ￿ c, a certi￿cation equilibrium exists i⁄
c ￿ c, and therefore both equilibria exist i⁄ c 2 [c;c].
To see the di⁄erential e⁄ects of certainty and uncertainty, ￿rst consider Figure 1(a) where
F and G are uniform so that the priors are (E[S];E[Q]) = (1=2;1=2). The updated expecta-
tions of S and Q for Q ￿ S and Q < S are given by the centers of mass of the upper and lower
triangles respectively, so E[QjQ ￿ S] = 2=3 and E[SjQ ￿ S] = 1=3, while E[QjQ < S] = 1=3
and E[SjQ < S] = 2=3.18 Therefore meeting the standard is good news about Q and bad
news about S, while failing to meet the standard is the opposite. We term the downward
adjustment of the estimate of S due to certi￿cation the ￿Groucho e⁄ect￿￿achieving the goal
diminishes the goal itself. And we term the upward adjustment to the estimate of S due to
lack of certi￿cation the ￿reverse Groucho e⁄ect￿￿failing to meet the goal enhances the goal
itself.19 These adjustments lead to a moderating e⁄ect on the estimates of Q where consumers
17That is, the prior distribution of Q is concentrated on [s;1] where s is distributed according to G. There
is no variation in the incentives of di⁄erent types to certify so, as discussed by Banks and Sobel (1987),
standard forward-induction arguments do not indicate that one type or another is a more plausible source
of the unexpected action. Allowing for more ￿skeptical￿beliefs about who deviates (e.g., Harbaugh and To,
2005) changes the results slightly, but the overall qualitative e⁄ects of uncertainty are unchanged.
18Given Q ￿ S the updated density of Q is f(q) = q=(1=2) = 2q and the updated density of S is g(s) =
(1 ￿ s)=(1=2) = 2 ￿ 2s. The densities are reversed for Q < S.
19To paraphrase Groucho Marx, ￿I would like to join a club that would not have me as a member.￿
8Figure 1: Updated Quality and Standard Estimates
are both less favorably impressed by certi￿cation and less unfavorably impressed by lack of
certi￿cation.
This can be seen by comparison with Figure 1(b) where F and G are still uniform and
the realized value s of the standard is known to consumers. The updated quality estimates
based on meeting the standard or not, E[QjQ ￿ s] = (1 + s)=2 and E[qjQ < s] = s=2, are
given respectively by the upper and lower lines in the ￿gure. Integrating these estimates of
Q over the di⁄erent values of s according to G we get the ex ante expected qualities for a
certain standard of E[E[QjQ ￿ s]] = 3=4 and E[E[QjQ < s] = 1=4. These are the average
expected qualities for the certain standard case where s is known, and they are the expected
qualities that would result for the uncertain standard case if the conditional distribution of
S did not become less favorable when Q ￿ S and more favorable when Q < S. Comparing
these expectations with those in Figure 1(a), the example illustrates the general rule
E[E[QjQ < s]] < E[QjQ < S] < E[Q] < E[QjQ ￿ S] < E[E[QjQ ￿ s]]; (8)
so meeting the labeling standard is better news on average if the standard is known for sure
than if it is uncertain, and not meeting it is worse news on average if the standard is known
for sure than if it is uncertain.
The relationship in (8) implies that condition (5) for a certi￿cation equilibrium is more
strict with uncertain standards than it is on average for a certain standard, and that con-
dition (6) for a non-certi￿cation equilibrium is less strict with uncertain standards than it
9is on average for a certain standard. Thus, the Groucho e⁄ect makes the condition for the
certi￿cation equilibrium harder to meet, and the reverse Groucho e⁄ect makes the condition
for the non-certi￿cation equilibrium easier to meet. The following proposition shows that
this result generated by the pattern in (8) holds generally when we compare the cost cuto⁄s
c = E[QjQ ￿ S] ￿ E[Q] and c = E[QjQ ￿ S] ￿ E[QjQ < S] for the case of an uncer-
tain standard S with the expected or average cuto⁄s E[c] = E[E[QjQ ￿ s]] ￿ E[Q]: and
E[c] = E[E[QjQ ￿ s]] ￿ E[E[QjQ < s]] for di⁄erent realized values of a certain standard
S = s.
Proposition 2 The expected range of certi￿cation costs supporting a certi￿cation (non-certi￿cation)
equilibrium is smaller (larger) if the standard is uncertain rather than certain.
Proof. This proof and all subsequent proofs are in the Appendix.
To gain further insight into these di⁄erences, consider Figure 2 where G is uniform and
F follows the Beta distribution B(q;a;b) which has mean E[Q] = a=(a + b). The Beta
distribution is always log-concave, is convex if a ￿ 1 and b = 1, and is concave if a = 1
and b ￿ 1.20 We assume that one or the other of these parameter restriction holds so the
distribution is either convex (a ￿good ￿rm￿ ) or concave (a ￿bad ￿rm￿ ) and so that the
distribution is uniquely determined by E[Q] as pictured in the Figure.
Figure 2(a) shows the cost cuto⁄c for the boundary of the non-certi￿cation region (N) from
the equilibrium condition (5), and the cost cuto⁄c for the boundary of the certi￿cation region
(C) from the equilibrium condition (6). Both certi￿cation and non-certi￿cation equilibria
exist in the region between the two lines, so the ￿gure illustrates the multiple equilibrium
result of Proposition 1. Figure 2(d) shows the certain standard case where the corresponding
regions are determined by the expected values E[c] and E[c] based on averaging out the
exact values for di⁄erent realizations of S = s. Comparison of the ￿gures illustrates the
result from Proposition 2 that uncertainty over the standard makes certi￿cation less likely
in that, relative to the case of certain standards, the equilibrium range for the certi￿cation
equilibrium is always smaller and the equilibrium range for the non-certi￿cation equilibrium
is always larger.
Considering the e⁄ect of prior expectations about ￿rm quality, when standards are uncer-
tain the Groucho e⁄ect is strongest for ￿bad ￿rms￿which consumers view most unfavorably
because consumers are suspicious of any standard that such a ￿rm can meet. Therefore it
becomes di¢ cult for a ￿rm with a bad reputation to successfully disprove that it is bad. This
is seen in Figure 2(a) where the certi￿cation region is at a minimum and the non-certi￿cation
region is at a maximum for E[Q] approaching 0.21 In contrast, when standards are cer-
tain there is no Groucho e⁄ect so bad ￿rms have the strongest incentive to certify. This
20For instance, the Beta distribution reduces to the uniform distribution for a = b = 1, a rising triangle
distribution for a = 2 and b = 1, and a falling triangle distribution for a = 1 and b = 2.
21For very high E[Q] the reverse Groucho e⁄ect also reduces the certi￿cation incentive. Certi￿cation in-
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is seen in Figure 2(a) where the certi￿cation equilibrium region is at a maximum and the
non-certi￿cation region at its minimum for low E[Q]. As will be seen in the following section,
and as illustrated in the remaining panels of Figure 2, the divergence between the certain and
uncertain cases becomes increasingly stark as the number of standards increases.
Proposition 2 shows that a certi￿cation equilibrium is less likely when standards are un-
certain in the sense that such an equilibrium is supported by a narrower range of costs. Now
consider the impact of uncertainty on the amount of information communicated when the cer-
ti￿cation equilibrium does exist. Recall from (8) that the Groucho (reverse Groucho) e⁄ect on
the estimated standard drives down (up) the consumer estimate of Q, in each case making it
closer to its ex ante mean. Put di⁄erently, because consumers learn about both Q and S from
the ￿rm￿ s certi￿cation decision, the information about Q alone is less informative than when
centives are strongest when priors about the ￿rm ￿rm are weakest. This is consistent with result from Xiao
(2006) that consumers put the most emphasis on the accreditation status of new ￿rms since their quality is
more uncertain. Relatedly, from a sociological perspective Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) ￿nd that middle
status types have the most incentive to meet social norms given the uncertainty of their status.
11S is known. In particular, for the case of uniform F and G in Figure 1 the mean-squared-error
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In both cases the error is reduced relative to the non-certi￿cation equilibrium where the
MSE is V ar[Q] = 1=12, but the expected reduction in MSE, i.e., the expected increase in
estimate precision or ￿informativeness￿ , is smaller when the standard is uncertain. Although
for particular realized values of S the informativeness of certi￿cation might be higher or lower
than in the uncertain case, uncertainty reduces informativeness on average as the following
proposition shows for general F and G.
Proposition 3 The expected informativeness of a certi￿cation equilibrium is lower if the
standard is uncertain than if it is certain.
Proof. See the Appendix.
From a policy perspective, more information about ￿rm quality allows consumers to more
accurately allocate their resources and therefore increases social welfare. For instance, as
shown by Jin and Leslie (2003) in the context of hygiene labels for restaurants, more accurate
information leads consumers to avoid bad ￿rms.22 Consequently, governments and NGOs, to
the extent that they care about social welfare, have an incentive to publicize labeling standards
so as to reduce the information losses from uncertain standards in the certi￿cation equilibrium.
This is in addition to the incentive identi￿ed in Proposition 2 to make standards more certain
so as to increase the likelihood of a certi￿cation equilibrium relatively to the completely
uninformative non-certi￿cation equilibrium. Thus, investments in clarifying label standards
can result in a double-dividend, enhancing both the likelihood and value of certi￿cation.
In the following section we show how the negative e⁄ects of uncertainty on voluntary
certi￿cation are compounded as the number of standards increases.
3 Multiple Standards
Often there are multiple di⁄erent standards that a ￿rm could meet, e.g., there are multiple
di⁄erent eco-labels, or multiple di⁄erent safety labels. As discussed in the introduction, the
22In addition, they ￿nd that more accurate information leads ￿rms to improve their quality. We take quality
as exogenous in our model. Lerner and Tirole (2006) allow for ￿rms to adjust their quality in response to
di⁄erent standards.
12proliferation of di⁄erent labels for some products is quite extreme. For instance, the website
Ecolabelling.org lists over 30 di⁄erent labels for forest products, over 10 di⁄erent labels for
carbon, over 40 di⁄erent labels for textiles, and over 100 di⁄erent labels for food products.
It might seem that more options should give ￿rms more ability to show o⁄ their quality, so
that certi￿cation increases. But the proliferation of standards is often blamed for creating
confusion among consumers that weakens the credibility of all labels and reduces certi￿cation
rates (Fischer et al., 2005). This suggests that an increase in standards can aggravate the
underlying problem of standard uncertainty.
To gain insight into how the proliferation of standards interacts with standard uncertainty,
we now assume that there are n ￿ 1 standards which are drawn independently from the same
distribution G and each have the same cost c. Following standard notation for order statistics
we denote the random variable representing the ith lowest realized standard by Si:n and its
distribution by Gi:n, so that G1:n represents the distribution of the worst standard and Gn:n
represents the distribution of the best standard. The ￿rm￿ s quality and the realized di¢ culties
of the di⁄erent standards are only known by the ￿rm, while F, G, c, and n are also known
by consumers.
For simplicity we assume that if a ￿rm meets multiple di⁄erent standards it can only certify
one of them. In some cases this captures a physical or contractual constraint, e.g., a lawyer
can only join one partnership or an article can be published in at most one journal. In other
cases it might be possible to display multiple certi￿cates, e.g., a product can display multiple
eco-labels. Since attaining and displaying extra certi￿cates is costly this possibility will not
a⁄ect our main qualitative results, though in some cases it can make a di⁄erence as we discuss
later.23 We also restrict attention initially to a ￿symmetric￿certi￿cation strategy where the
￿rm adopts the toughest standard that it meets independent of any arbitrary properties of
the ex ante identical standards.24 That is, for now we do not consider ￿focal￿equilibrium
strategies where it is assumed that a particular standard will be certi￿ed if that standard is
met.
23The restriction to one standard does not a⁄ect the conditions for existence of certi￿cation and non-
certi￿cation equilibria if there are constant or diminishing returns to certifying attainment of multiple stan-
dards. This holds, for instance, for uniform F and G. But if returns are increasing over some range, then it
might be worthwhile to be certi￿ed by multiple standards even if it would not be worthwhile to certify having
met a single standard, e.g., a restaurant might display multiple certi￿cates in its window. Since the marginal
value of any standard goes to 0 as the number of standards increases, the limiting results of this section are
una⁄ected by the possibility of multiple certi￿cations.
24It is straightforward that any equilibrium symmetric strategy provides equivalent information about ￿rm
quality to consumers. For instance, if a ￿rm has a strategy of always adopting the second toughest standard
that it meets and not adopting a standard if it only meets one standard, then if in fact it only meets one
standard it has an incentive to deviate and adopt the one standard. If this strategy is adjusted so that the
￿rm is expected to disclose the one standard in this case, then consumers learn the same information as if the
￿rm always disclosed the toughest standard.
13Since consumers do not know which of the standards is more di¢ cult, certi￿cation under
a symmetric certi￿cation strategy only proves that a ￿rm has met the easiest standard but
nothing more, even if the ￿rm has in fact met the best standard. From the perspective of
consumers, the only information of use in computing the ￿rm￿ s expected quality is that the
￿rm has met at least one of the n possible standards. Hence the incentives to certify or
not certify are exactly the same as in the previous section, with the only exception that we
replace the random variable S with the random variable S1:n representing the weakest of the
n standards. Therefore, following conditions (5) and (6), for uncertain standards a symmetric
certi￿cation equilibrium exists if and only if
E[QjQ ￿ S1:n] ￿ E[QjQ < S1:n] ￿ c (11)
and a non-certi￿cation equilibrium exists if and only if
E[QjQ ￿ S1:n] ￿ E[Q] ￿ c: (12)
For certain standards the conditions are quite di⁄erent because consumers know the dif-
￿culty of the standard that was met, and also know the di¢ culty of standards that were not
met. We de￿ne a certi￿cation equilibrium for certain standards as an equilibrium in which
any of the di⁄erent standards is certi￿ed. For instance, a ￿rm might ￿nd it worth the costs to
certify a high standard if it meets it but not worth the costs to only certify a lower standard.25
Following (xx), a certi￿cation equilibrium exists if and only if some ￿rm types ￿nd it more
pro￿table to pay the certi￿cation cost and prove that they meet a particular standard (and
none higher) than to be thought of as coming from the whole range below that standard,26
i.e., if and only if
max
i=1;::;n
fE[Qjsi:n ￿ Q ￿ si+1:n] ￿ E[QjQ < si:n]g ￿ c; (13)
where we de￿ne sn+1:n = 1. The condition for a non-certi￿cation equilibrium is simpler since
non-certi￿cation always gives a payo⁄ of E[Q], implying that the incentive to unexpectedly
certify is always highest for those meeting the highest standard. In particular, under our
belief re￿nement a non-certi￿cation equilibrium exists if and only if
E[QjQ ￿ sn:n] ￿ E[Q] ￿ c: (14)
As shown in Figure 2, these conditions imply that behavior with uncertain standards
diverges dramatically from that with certain standards as the number of standards n increases.
25That is, due to certi￿cation costs, there need not be full ￿unravelling￿in which all ￿rms above the lowest
quality certify (e.g., Viscusi, 1978).
26Given that ￿rms meeting standard i certify, ￿rms meeting an even higher standard will also want to
certify, so the binding constraint is for standard i.
14Comparing panel (a) with panels (b) and (c), as n increases the incentive for ￿bad￿￿rms
to certify disappears, while the incentive for ￿good￿ ￿rms to certify becomes completely
dependent on consumer expectations about whether certi￿cation is expected or not, i.e., both
certi￿cation and non-certi￿cation are always equilibria for such ￿rms. In contrast, comparing
panel (d) with panels (e) and (f), for certain standards as n increases the incentive for ￿bad￿
￿rms to certify becomes increasingly strong, while the incentive for ￿good￿￿rms to certify
disappears.
These di⁄erences arise because an increase in the number of certain standards gives ￿rms
more opportunities to disprove low expectations, but an increase in the number of uncertain
standards means that the persuasive value of certi￿cation falls. In particular, for uncertain
standards in the limit as n increases G1:n puts all weight on S = 0, so certi￿cation is meaning-
less while failure to certify is quite damning. Therefore (11) and (12) simplify to E[Q]￿0 ￿ c
and E[Q]￿E[Q] ￿ c, so we get the pattern in panel (c) where a certi￿cation equilibrium exists
for any c if and only if the prior estimate E[Q] is su¢ ciently good, and a non-certi￿cation
equilibrium always exists. Hence we ￿nd that ￿bad￿￿rms ￿nd it impossible to disprove ex-
pectations, while ￿good￿￿rms face strategic uncertainty over whether they should certify or
not. If certi￿cation is not expected then they gain nothing from unexpectedly certifying, but
if certi￿cation is expected and they don￿ t certify then consumers infer they are of the lowest
possible type.
For certain standards in the limit as n increases there is essentially a di⁄erent standard for
each possible quality, so the problem reduces to the well-understood case where the ￿rm can
prove its exact quality and conditions (13) and (14) simplify to maxs fs ￿ E[QjQ < s]g ￿ c
and 1￿E[Q] ￿ c respectively. If F is log-concave as in the Beta distribution used in Figure 2,
then s￿E[QjQ < s] is increasing in s (Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005, Lemma 1), so following
Lizzeri (1999, Theorem 1),27 if 1 ￿ E[Q] ￿ c there is a unique certi￿cation equilibrium in
which types q such that q ￿ E[QjQ < q] = c and higher all certify and lower types do not
certify. Therefore we get the pattern in panel (f) where for any given c > 0 certi￿cation is the
unique equilibrium for a bad enough prior estimate E[Q] and non-certi￿cation is the unique
equilibrium for a good enough prior estimate E[Q].
The following proposition shows that these patterns in Figure 2 are not limited to the
distributional assumptions of the example. They hold generally for uncertain standards and
hold for certain standards as long as the distribution of F is log-concave. The results for
certain standards follow almost directly from Lizzeri (1999, Theorem 1).
Proposition 4 Suppose there are n i.i.d. standards. If standards are uncertain, (i) the sup-
port of a non-certi￿cation equilibrium is increasing in n, and, in the limit as n increases: (ii)
27Lizzeri (1999) analyzes this case where certi￿cation costs are given and each quality level can be certi￿ed
as a step toward understanding the case where costs and standards are chosen by the certi￿cation intermediary
to maximize pro￿ts.
15non-certi￿cation is an equilibrium for all c > 0; (iii) symmetric certi￿cation is an equilibrium
if and only if E[Q] ￿ c; and (iv) the symmetric certi￿cation equilibrium is uninformative. If
standards are certain and F is log-concave, in the limit as n increases: (v) non-certi￿cation
is almost surely an equilibrium if and only if E[Q] ￿ 1 ￿ c; and (vi) certi￿cation is almost
surely an equilibrium if and only if E[Q] ￿ 1 ￿ c.
Recall that Proposition 3 showed that certi￿cation is always less informative when stan-
dards are uncertain. Proposition 4(iv) shows that for large n this result is even stronger in
that, even though certi￿cation can still be an equilibrium for large n, the informativeness of
certi￿cation when standards are uncertain goes to zero in that estimates of Q are no better
than the prior estimates without certi￿cation. Certi￿cation is therefore completely wasteful
in that in equilibrium the ￿rm proves that it is not of the lowest type, but the ￿rm does not
bene￿t relative to prior expectations and consumers do not learn any information since the
￿rm being of the lowest type is a zero probability event anyway. This contrasts with the result
for certain standards where as n increases certi￿cation becomes highly informative for ￿rms
who certify and the only residual uncertainty arises from ￿rms who do not certify because of
the certi￿cation costs.
This ￿nding that certi￿cation provides no new information as n increases is related to the
￿nding by Lizzeri (1999) that a certi￿cation intermediary who is interested in maximizing
certi￿cation revenues will often choose the lowest possible standard with the result that there
is no net gain in information to consumers. Since a ￿rm that does not meet the standard will
be thought of as extremely low quality, ￿rms are willing to pay a high cost for the certi￿cate,
and since the certi￿cate is so easy, almost all of them are able to pay for the certi￿cate and
receive it. Therefore the certi￿cation intermediary bene￿ts the most from a low standard.
Our model di⁄ers in the assumption that there are multiple exogenous certi￿cation standards
rather than an endogenous standard (or standards) chosen by the certi￿cation intermediary,
and that there is a ￿xed cost to certi￿cation rather than a price adjusted by the intermediary,
but we ￿nd the same result that consumers do not actually bene￿t from certi￿cation even as
￿rms feel forced to expend substantial resources on it.
With multiple standards one standard is sometimes ￿focal￿or ￿salient￿in that consumers
expect ￿rms to adopt the standard if they are able to, even if they also meet another potentially
more demanding standard. For instance, in many European countries regional or national
eco-labels appear to be focal relative to the E.U. Flower Label, e.g., the Nordic Swan label
and German Blue Angel labels are more widely adopted for almost all product categories (xx).
Given the focality of these labels and that consumers do not know which labeling standards
are tougher, consumers might infer that a ￿rm which displayed the E.U. Flower label was
only able to attain it and not the focal label. Similarly, in academic environments it is often
the case that a particular journal is focal for a discipline so that failure to publish in that
journal is a bad sign even if another journal is known by specialists in the ￿eld to be more
16selective.
It might seem that information ￿ ows will decrease if ￿rms are expected to choose a focal
standard rather than the one they know to be toughest. To see how a focal standard can
increase rather decreases information ￿ ows, we now consider ￿focal certi￿cation strategies￿
based on arbitrary properties of the standards that are unrelated to their di¢ culty. In such a
strategy there is one standard, say standard X, that a ￿rm is expected to adopt if it can. If
the ￿rm adopts another standard, say standard Y , then it is assumed that it could not meet
standard X and that standard Y was the best of the other standards it did meet. For certain
standards, a ￿rm will clearly certify whichever standard is toughest so any equilibrium based
on focal strategies will break down. But for uncertain standards, consumers do not know which
standard is tougher so such a focal certi￿cation equilibrium is possible. Such an equilibrium
is more informative than a symmetric certi￿cation equilibrium as the following proposition
shows.28
Proposition 5 Suppose there are n i.i.d. standards. (i) If standards are uncertain and c is
su¢ ciently low there exists a focal certi￿cation equilibrium that is more informative than the
symmetric certi￿cation equilibrium. iii) If standards are certain a focal certi￿cation equilib-
rium cannot exist. the equilibrium conditions
The focality of a standard eliminates the problems caused by multiplicity of voluntary
standards. The result is similar to the n = 1 case in that there is no degradation of the
expected di¢ culty of the standard, but it is actually better since the presence of additional
standards makes it is more likely that there will be some certi￿cation, implying there is more
information for consumers. As discussed in the introduction, this result provides a large role
for governments and NGOs in not just setting and clarifying standards, but in attempting
to make particular standards focal. ￿Look for the label￿ campaigns can help induce an
equilibrium where consumers expect a particular standard to be used, and look less favorably
on adoption of other labels. The key is not necessarily that the focal label has a higher
standard, or that the standard be certain, but simply that there is a single standard which
consumers expect ￿rms to try to attain.
This result on focal certi￿cation equilibria is closely related to a ￿nding by Fishman
and Hagerty (1990) who analyze a persuasion game with costless disclosure where there are
multiple noisy signals about whether an investment project is pro￿table or not, and assume
that a ￿rm can only reveal one of them. Similar to our result they ￿nd that a ￿lexicographic￿
equilibrium is most informative in which a ￿rm releases the ￿rst signal that is favorable in
28The following proposition looks at the case where costs are su¢ ciently low that a ￿rm will adopt another
standard if it cannot meet the focal standard, even though adopting the other standard is less impressive. It
can also be an equilibrium for a ￿rm to adopt the focal standard if it can and to not adopt any standard if
it cannot meet the focal standard. For su¢ ciently many standards such an equilibrium is more informative
than the symmetric disclosure equilibrium.
17accordance with a set order that is anticipated by receivers, so that releasing another favorable
signal is therefore evidence that the ￿rst signal was not favorable.29
Whether in practice information campaigns can successfully make standards ￿focal￿ is
an empirical question. An alternative solution is to simply make it mandatory for a ￿rm
to disclose whether it meets a particular standard. In this case bad news on this manda-
tory standard can still be supplemented with good news on other standards, so the result is
essentially the same as in the focal equilibrium if the certi￿cation costs for the mandatory
standards are taken as sunk costs. Therefore the informativeness result of Proposition 5 also
provides an argument for mandatory certi￿cation of a particular label, even if consumers do
not know the exact standard for the label.
4 Multiple Firms
The results so far highlight the negative impact on certi￿cation incentives from uncertain
standards. If there are multiple ￿rms adopting or not adopting di⁄erent standards, and
labels are su¢ ciently distinct to be easily di⁄erentiated and remembered, it might seem that
eventually consumers should be able to learn relatively detailed estimates of the di¢ culty
of di⁄erent standards from these adoption patterns. In this section we show that, when
certi￿cation is voluntary, the problem of learning is complicated both by multiple equilibria
and by the incentives of ￿rms to choose standards strategically in a way that interferes with
learning.
First consider the simplest case where there are m ￿rms with i.i.d. qualities Q1;:::;Qm
facing a single standard S. Assume that ￿rms know the realized values of their own and each
other￿ s qualities q1;...;qm and the realized di¢ culty of the standard s, but that consumers
only know F, G, c and m. If all ￿rms which can meet the standard certify, then the fraction
of ￿rms which certify is clearly quite informative about the di¢ culty of the standard. Indeed
by a standard Law of Large Numbers result, as the number of ￿rms increases, the estimate
of the standard becomes asymptotically precise. As stated in the ￿rst part of the following
Proposition, this implies that the situation for each ￿rm is equivalent to that of a single ￿rm
facing a certain standard as examined in Section 2.
However, because there are often multiple equilibria, there is still no assurance that con-
sumers will learn about the standard from observing the certi￿cation pattern of ￿rms. Suppose
that each ￿rm does not expect the gains from certi￿cation to be worth the certi￿cation costs.
Then each ￿rm receives the prior estimate E[Qi] and if a ￿rm deviates consumers learn no
29For more than two signals the lexicographic equilibrium they consider di⁄ers from our focal equilibrium
because there is a backup second ￿focal￿ standard, then a third, etc. Because our setup is complicated by
allowing for a continuum of ￿rm types and quality standards, and because such a full degree of coordination
appears unlikely for product labels, we do not evaluate such a lexicographic strategy.
18more than they did in Section 2, so the gain from deviating is just E[QijQi ￿ S]. Hence,
as stated in the second part of the following Proposition, the condition for a nondisclosure
equilibrium remains exactly the same as that of a single ￿rm facing an uncertain standard as
examined in Section 2.
Proposition 6 Suppose m i.i.d. ￿rms face a single standard. If the standard is uncertain:
(i) the expected support of a certi￿cation equilibrium converges to that of a single ￿rm with a
certain standard as m increases; and (ii) the expected support of a non-certi￿cation equilibrium
is the same as for m = 1. (iii) If the standard is certain the expected support of any equilibrium
is the same as for m = 1.
Looking back at Figure 2, this Proposition implies that the region where the certi￿cation
and non-certi￿cation equilibria coexist expands from the ￿C,N￿regions in the separate panels
of (a) and (d) to encompass the area underneath E[c] in panel (a) and above c in panel (d).
Therefore even though the presence of multiple ￿rms can potentially reduce uncertainty over
the standard by the ￿rst part of the proposition, it need not do so by the second part of
the proposition, and the combination of these results implies that there is increased strategic
uncertainty due to multiple equilibria. NEW This uncertainty can leave consumers even less
sure of the standard than if there were no opportunity to observe the certi￿cation behavior
of multiple ￿rms.30
Now considering the case where there are both multiple ￿rms and multiple standards, we
￿nd that learning about standards is made more di¢ cult because adoption of one standard by
a ￿rm creates an information externality or spillover that can a⁄ect the incentives for other
￿rms to certify. With multiple standards if a ￿rm always adopts the toughest standard that it
meets then adoption of a standard might be good news about the standard which counteracts
the Groucho e⁄ect. With multiple ￿rms this ￿selection e⁄ect￿implies that a good ￿rm can
￿legitimize￿a standard and make it more attractive to other ￿rms, and a bad ￿rm can ￿spoil￿
a standard and make it less attractive to other ￿rms. As a result ￿rms have an incentive to
choose standards strategically in a way that interferes with consumer learning.
To gain insight into this incentive, ￿rst suppose there are two i.i.d. standards and two i.i.d.
￿rms. If one ￿rm has the strategy of adopting the toughest standard it meets and the prior F
is very favorable, then the standard which it adopts is likely to be the better one. This gives
the other ￿rm an incentive to adopt the same standard, regardless of whether the standard is
really the toughest. Conversely, if the prior F is very unfavorable, then the standard which is
adopted is still likely to be the worse one. This gives the other ￿rm has an incentive to adopt
30This is seen for the E.U. Flower Label which has di⁄erent standards for di⁄erent product categories, and
where label adoption rates for the categories vary greatly. For instance, consumers could interpret the absence
of adoption by any any major laundry detergent products either as re￿ecting a non-certi￿cation equilibrium
or as strong evidence that the certi￿cation standard for detergents is very strict. In this case the former
interpretation appears to be correct (Rubik and Frankl, 2005).
19the opposite standard, regardless of whether it is really the toughest. Therefore in both cases
￿rms have an incentive to deviate from a simple strategy of adopting the toughest standard.
This is seen in Figure 3(a) for two ￿rms with i.i.d. quality given by the Beta distribution
as before. De￿ne E[QijSame] as the expected quality of ￿rm i when the toughest standard
that each ￿rm meets is the same, and E[QijDi⁄erent] as the expected quality of ￿rm i when
this is not true. For the case of two i.i.d. standards and two i.i.d. standards, the former
equals
E[QijS1:2 ￿ Q1;Q2 < S2:2 [ S1:2 < S2:2 ￿ Q1;Q2] (15)
and the latter equals
E[QijS1:2 ￿ Q1 < S2:2 < Q2 [ S1:2 ￿ Q2 < S2:2 ￿ Q1]: (16)
Because the ￿rms are i.i.d., E[Q1jSame] = E[Q2jSame] and E[Q1jDi⁄erent] = E[Q2jDi⁄erent],
so if (15)>(16) both ￿rms will prefer to adopt the same standard even if one meets a higher
standard, and if (15)<(16) both ￿rms will prefer to adopt a di⁄erent standard even if they
both meet the higher standard. Only in the knife-edge case where (15)=(16) and the ￿rms
are just indi⁄erent, is it an equilibrium for ￿rms to follow the symmetric always adopt the
toughest standard they meet. This is seen in the ￿gure where, unless E[Qi] = 1=2, ￿rms have
an incentive to either pool with each other or separate from each other by choosing standards
strategically. The following proposition states this result more generally for m ￿rms and n
standards where again the realized di¢ culties and qualities are known by the ￿rms but only
F; G, c, m, and n are known to consumers. The proof follows from the above argument.
Proposition 7 Suppose m i.i.d. ￿rms face n i.i.d. standards. i) If the standards are uncer-
tain then for m > 1 there exists a symmetric certi￿cation equilibrium only if E[QijSame] =
E[QijDifferent]. ii) If the standards are certain then the support of any equilibrium is the
same as for m = 1.
The incentive to choose standards strategically can be aggravated if consumers have dif-
ferent priors about the di⁄erent ￿rms. Figure 3(b) shows the case where a ￿good￿￿rm G has
convex Beta distribution parameterized by (￿;1) and a ￿bad￿￿rm B has the symmetric con-
cave independent Beta distribution parameterized by (1;￿) so E[QG]￿E[QB] = (￿￿1)=(￿+1).
When ￿ = 1 so both ￿rms have uniformly distributed quality, E[QG] = E[QB] = 1=2, there
is no incentive to be strategic, but as soon as a gap emerges the good ￿rm always wants to
choose a di⁄erent standard than the bad ￿rm, and the bad ￿rm always wants to choose the
same standard as the good ￿rm. If both ￿rms adopt the same standard, it is likely that only
the weaker of the two standards was met, which is bad news for the good ￿rm but still good
news for the bad ￿rm. And if both ￿rms adopt di⁄erent standards, it is likely that the good
￿rm met the tougher standard and the bad ￿rm met the weaker standard, so the good ￿rm
20Figure 3: Strategic Choice of Standards
gains and the bad ￿rm loses. So there cannot be an equilibrium in which each ￿rm always
adopts the toughest standard it meets. Instead, if both ￿rms meet both standards, there must
be a mixed strategy equilibrium where the bad ￿rm tries to choose the same standard as the
good ￿rm and the good ￿rm tries to avoid such an outcome.
These problems with multiple equilibria and strategic choice of standards are eliminated
if certi￿cation is mandatory. If all ￿rms are required to display a quality certi￿cate, then
consumers can learn about the meaning of the standards from their experiences with di⁄erent
products. And if there are multiple di⁄erent standards, making one standard the mandatory
standard removes the incentive or ability to adopt standards selectively. Similarly, government
or NGO e⁄orts to make one standard focal can also reduce the multiple equilibrium problem
as shown in Section 3, and can help avoid the strategizing in the symmetric equilibrium
analyzed above. For instance, if it is believed that a ￿rm always adopts standard X unless
it can only meet standard Y and not standard X, then clearly each ￿rm has an incentive to
adopt standard X regardless of what the other ￿rms do.
As discussed in the introduction, a common strategy when introducing a new eco-label is
to try to induce the most reputable companies to adopt the label with the hope that other
companies will then adopt it.31 Similar strategies occur in many other contexts, e.g., new
31Since there is a second-mover advantage that can create a war of attrition, a good ￿rm needs some incentive
to move ￿rst.
21journals try to start with articles by respected authors. The above analysis implies that
information spillovers may be one reason for this strategy. If a good ￿rm moves ￿rst then the
bad ￿rm can always choose the same standard if it is capable of doing so. Therefore the good
￿rm has no incentive to deliberately choose a weaker standard and, if it faces any uncertainty
at all over whether the bad ￿rm will meet the tougher standard, it has a strict incentive to
choose the tougher standard.
Finally, we have assumed that ￿rms do not care directly how other ￿rms are regarded by
consumers, but only care if the standard itself is diminished or enhanced due to the actions
of other ￿rms. In many situations ￿rms will be in the same industry and therefore have
a competitive incentive to look good relative to other ￿rms by undermining their competi-
tors￿perceived quality.32 The above analysis shows that, even without such product market
externalities, ￿rms need to worry about the strategic e⁄ects of certi￿cation decisions.
5 Conclusion
The policy literature on eco-labels and other quality certi￿cation schemes has long recognized
that consumer uncertainty over the standards needed for certi￿cation is a major hurdle to
their adoption and e⁄ective use. We show that concern over the e⁄ects of such uncertainty
is well-founded. Since consumers must jointly update the quality of the product and the
di¢ culty of the standard, there are direct information losses and also substantial indirect
losses as ￿rms decide whether it is worthwhile to be certi￿ed and, if so, which of multiple
labels or certi￿cates to adopt. We ￿nd that uncertainty discourages certi￿cation when it
is most bene￿cial to consumers and ￿rms, that the e⁄ects of uncertainty are aggravated by
the proliferation of di⁄erent standards, that strategic uncertainty due to multiple equilibria
becomes particularly problematic as the number of standards increases, and that information
spillovers give ￿rms an incentive to strategically choose among di⁄erent standards so as to
make learning about standards more di¢ cult for consumers.
Mandatory standards can also su⁄er from direct information losses due to uncertainty
but preclude the additional indirect losses due to ￿rm certi￿cation decisions, and can also
facilitate consumer learning about standards. Therefore these results provide an additional
consideration in the debate over voluntary versus mandatory certi￿cation of product quality.
Short of mandatory standards, we ￿nd that making one standard ￿focal￿can also reduce the
indirect information losses. ￿Look for the label￿ promotional campaigns that induce con-
sumers and ￿rms to focus on a particular label, even if the standard for it remains uncertain,
32However, in models of vertical quality di⁄erentiation ￿rms might prefer to have di⁄erent qualities to reduce
competition (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982). The resulting e⁄ect on disclosure
incentives with a ￿xed standard and exogenous quality is analyzed by Hotz and Hsiao (2004), Board (2005),
and Levin, Peck and Li (2005).
22can increase certi￿cation incentives, reduce the problem of strategic uncertainty due to mul-
tiple equilibria, and eliminate the incentive to choose among standards strategically due to
information spillovers from other ￿rms.
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, then (19) is equivalent to
R 1
0 E[QjQ ￿ s]dP(s) ￿
R 1






(P(s) ￿ G(s))ds ￿ 0:
Therefore, since d
dsE[QjQ ￿ s] > 0, the inequality holds if G(s) ￿ P(s) for all s.33 This is
33Note that, having de￿ned the new distribution P, the rest of this proof is just showing that P First Order
Stochastically Dominates G:











































































































f(t)(1 ￿ G(t))dt ￿ 0 (20)
where we have used integration by parts in the ￿fth step. The ￿nal inequality holds for all s
since G is bounded by 1.

















which, by the same arguments as above, always holds. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3: Let q = E[QjQ < S] and q = E[QjQ ￿ S], and, for the realized

















(q2 ￿ 2qq + q2)dF(q) +
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F(s)q(s)2 + (1 ￿ F(s))q(s)2￿
dG(s): (23)























q2 ￿ 2qq(s) + q(s)2￿
+ (1 ￿ F(s))
￿









+ (1 ￿ F(s))(q ￿ q(s))
2
￿
dG(s) > 0 (24)
so the MSE is larger for the uncertain case. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4: (i) We ￿rst want to show that G1:n ￿MLR G1:n+1 i.e., the




(k ￿ 1)!(n ￿ k)!
G(x)k￿1(1 ￿ G(x))n￿kg(x); (25)








(n + 1)(1 ￿ G(x))ng(x)
￿
(n)(1 ￿ G(y))n￿1g(y)







() G(x) ￿ G(y) (26)
which holds for all x < y. Now we want to show that if G ￿MLR H then it is better good



















25which can be rewritten as
R 1
0 E[qjq ￿ s](1 ￿ F(s))g(s)ds
R 1
0 (1 ￿ F(s))g(s)ds
￿
R 1
0 E[qjq ￿ s](1 ￿ F(s))h(s)ds
R 1
0 (1 ￿ F(s))h(s)ds
: (28)
De￿ne p(s) = (1￿F(s))g(s)=
R 1
0 (1￿F(t))g(t)dt and q(s) = (1￿F(s))h(s)=
R 1
0 (1￿F(t))h(t)dt.
Since E[qjq ￿ s] is increasing in s, the above condition holds if P(s) ￿FOSD Q(s). By the






















0 (1 ￿ F(x))g(x)dx
p(y)
R 1
0 (1 ￿ F(x))g(x)dx
￿
R y
0 (1 ￿ F(x))h(x)dx
p(y)
R 1
















so P reverse hazard rate dominates Q which implies P(s) ￿FOSD Q(s) and hence G ￿MLR H.
Letting G = G1:N and H = G1:n+1 this establishes that E[QjQ > S1:n] ￿ E[QjQ > S1:n+1].
Therefore, from (12), the support of a non-certi￿cation equilibrium is increasing in n.
(ii) Formalizing the argument in the text, by the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem, the empirical
distribution Gn(s) of n standards converges uniformly to the theoretical distribution G as n
goes to in￿nity, implying that for any " > 0 the minimum of these standards is almost surely
less than " in the limit. Hence the expected quality from unexpected certi￿cation converges
to 0 in the limit, and the necessary and su¢ cient condition (12) for non-certi￿cation reduces
to E[Q] ￿ E[Q] ￿ c or c ￿ 0.
(iii) By the same argument as in (iv), the expected quality from non-certi￿cation when
types who can certify any standard converges to 0 in the limit, and expected quality from
such certi￿cation converges to E[Q] in the limit, so the necessary and su¢ cient condition (11)
for a symmetric certi￿cation equilibrium reduces to E[Q] ￿ 0 ￿ c.
(iv) By the same argument as in (iv) in the limit as n increases, a ￿rm meets the worst
of the n standards almost surely and expected quality conditional on meeting the standard
equals E[Q], so the expected MSE in the certi￿cation equilibrium just equals the variance of
F.
(v) For any ￿rm of type q, consider the largest realized standard s such that q ￿ s and the
smallest realized standard s such that s ￿ q. Given s and s, in a non-certi￿cation equilibrium
26if the ￿rm certi￿es then it has expected quality E[Qjs ￿ q < s] and if it does not certify
then it still has expected quality E[Q], so non-certi￿cation is an equilibrium if and only if
E[Qjs ￿ q < s] ￿ c. By the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem, the empirical distribution Gn(s)
of n standards converges uniformly to the theoretical distribution G as n goes to in￿nity, so
for any " > 0, for any q, maxfq ￿ s;s ￿ qg < " for su¢ ciently large m. Therefore, since
E[Qjs ￿ q < s] 2 [s;s], for any ￿rm of type q, in the limit E[Qjs ￿ q < s] = q almost surely.
So the condition for a non-certi￿cation equilibrium is q ￿E[Q] ￿ c for all q, or 1￿E[Q] ￿ c.
(vi) Following the same argument as in (v), the condition for a symmetric certi￿cation
equilibrium is E[Qjs ￿ q < s]￿E[Qjq ￿ s] ￿ c, which converges to q￿E[QjQ ￿ q] ￿ c almost
surely. Following Lizzeri (1999, Theorem 1), the LHS is increasing in q if F is quasiconcave
(Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005), so there is a unique q￿ such that the condition holds with
equality. In any equilibrium all types q < q￿ do not certify and all types q ￿ q￿ do certify. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5: (i) Consider a focal certi￿cation equilibrium in which a ￿rm
that does not meet the focal standard instead adopts the highest other standard it meets.
The estimation of the focal standard is not a⁄ected by the number of standards present on
the market, so such a focal certi￿cation equilibrium exists if types meeting the focal standard
adopt it,
E[QjQ ￿ S] ￿ E[QjQ < S1:n] ￿ c; (30)
and types meeting another standard adopt it,
E[QjS1:n ￿ Q ￿ S] ￿ E[QjQ < S1:n] ￿ c: (31)
The latter condition is clearly binding and holds for su¢ ciently low c. In such an equilibrium
consumers learn that the ￿rm did not meet even the lowest standard, Q < S1:n, or that the
￿rm met the lowest standard but not the focal standard, S1:n ￿ Q < S, or that the ￿rm met
the focal standard, Q ￿ S. In a symmetric certi￿cation equilibrium they learn only that the
￿rm met or did not meet the lowest standard, Q < S1:n or Q ￿ S1:n. The former partition is
￿ner so it reveals more information.
(ii) Suppose the ￿rm is following a focal certi￿cation strategy of always adopting a standard
X even if standard Y is tougher. Since consumers know which standard is tougher, this is
only possible if consumer beliefs ￿punish￿the ￿rm for choosing Y out of equilibrium. But
under our belief re￿nement, we assume that any type is equally likely to have deviated, so the
expected quality of adopting Y is higher and the proposed strategy is not an equilibrium. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6: (i) Suppose each ￿rm follows the certi￿cation equilibrium
strategy of certifying when it meets the standard. Then the conditional density of S given
that k of m ￿rms certify is
g(sjQm￿k:m < S ￿ Qm￿k+1:m) =
(1 ￿ F(s))kF(s)m￿k
R 1
0 (1 ￿ F(s))kF(s)m￿kdG(s)
: (32)
27From the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem, the empirical distribution Fm(q) of m ￿rm qualities
converges uniformly to the theoretical distribution F as m goes to in￿nity. Therefore for any
realization of s = s0, limm!1 k=m = 1 ￿ F(s0) almost surely. Hence,
lim






0 (1 ￿ F(s))m(1￿F(s0))F(s)mF(s0)dG(s)
: (33)
For any m, it is straightforward to show that the MLE estimate of s is s0. We want to show
that this estimate is asymptotically precise in that
lim
m!1
g(sjQm￿k:m < S ￿ Qm￿k+1:m)
g(s0jQm￿k:m < S ￿ Qm￿k+1:m)
= 0 (34)













Taking the log of the base and di⁄erentiating with respect to s, the base reaches a unique
maximum of 1 at s = s0. Therefore for any s 6= s0, the base is less than 1, implying the whole
term goes to 0 as m ! 1. This con￿rms that, in the limit for large m, for each realization
of s from the distribution G consumers infer s exactly. The condition for each ￿rm to follow
the proposed strategy is then E[QijQi > s] ￿ E[QijQi < s] ￿ c, implying that the expected
support for the equilibrium over the distribution of possible standards is c < E[c] where
E[c] = E[E[QijQi > s]] ￿ E[E[QijQi < s]]; (36)
which is the same as that for a single ￿rm facing a certain standard.
(ii) Suppose each ￿rm follows a strategy of non-certi￿cation. The expected payo⁄ from
nondisclosure for a single ￿rm is just E[Qi]. If a single ￿rm deviates, then as discussed
our belief re￿nement is that the certi￿cation is treated as good news that concentrates the
posterior distribution of Qi on [s;1] where s is distributed according to G. Therefore the
payo⁄ to a single ￿rm from deviating is E[QijQi > S] ￿ c, so the equilibrium condition for
non-certi￿cation is
E[QijQi > S]] ￿ E[Qi] < c (37)
which is the same as that for a single ￿rm facing an uncertain standard.
(iii) If the standard is certain then the ￿rms by de￿nition learn nothing about the dis-
tribution of standards from which ￿rms adopt di⁄erent standards. Hence the equilibrium
conditions are the same as if there is only one ￿rm. ￿
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